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Abstract
We consider a supply chain where the quality level can be observed by the buyer(s) only
after the purchase is completed (experience good). If the delivered quality is below the levels
agreed in the contract, the buyer(s) may take action to seek remedy, but this effort is costly.
Obviously, this fact can be exploited by the seller. In the case of a single buyer, we show
that the buyer may not be motivated to appropriate all the channel profits but, rather, is
able to pay a higher purchase price in order to induce the seller to provide higher quality.
The set of purchase prices that support trade split into different regions. We identify regions
where counterintuitive behavior is exhibited, for example, the buyer prefers higher purchase
price, while the seller prefers lower purchase price.
For the case of more than one buyer, we examine and contrast the behavior of two remedy
regimes: In the case of individual enforcement, each buyer must work individually to enforce
her own quality. In the case of joint enforcement, all buyers benefit from enforcement by a
single buyer. We examine the externalities that arise in this supply chain and identify how
the market share, enforcement costs and purchase price affect the quality level.
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1 Introduction
What happens when a supplier does not meet his contractual obligations? In this paper,
we study a supply chain comprising a single seller and multiple buyers in which the quality
level can be observed by the buyer(s) only after the purchase is completed (experience good
(see, for example, Washburn et al. (2004)) and buyer(s) have to incur a transaction cost to
enforce (mutually agreed upon) quality standards. For the case of more than one buyer, we
study two types of enforcement regimes, individual and joint. In the individual enforcement
regime, if a buyer enforces the contract, the seller refunds the purchase cost of the defective
units to this buyer only. In the joint enforcement case, which is similar to a “class action”
scenario, the seller must refund the purchase price of all buyers, even if only one of them
goes through the trouble of enforcing the contract. Obviously, this creates a “free rider”
problem amongst the buyers. We examine the externalities that arise in this supply chain
and characterize the market equilibria.
The extant literature on contract theory in the context of inventory and pricing decisions
in supply chains is exhaustive (see, for example, Anupindi and Bassok (1999) and Plambeck
and Taylor (2006)). Cachon (2001) is an excellent survey paper on the topic. However, the
literature on contracts in the context of quality is more limited (see, for example, Reyniers
(1992) and Reyniers and Tapiero (1995)). Below, we briefly discuss the literature that is
most relevant to our work.
Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) model the effect of contract parameters such as price re-
bates and after-sales warranty costs on the choice of quality of the supplier, the inspection
policy of the buyer and the resulting end quality. In their model, the supplier of a part
chooses technology and this choice is not observed by the buyer, who independently chooses
his inspection policy. Lim (2001) extends the Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) framework to
the case where this incomplete information regarding the quality of parts. Starbird (2001)
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considers a supplier who selects a batch size and quality level. He shows that when sampling
inspection is used, penalties and rewards are substitutes for one another in motivating the
supplier. Kaya and Ozer (2004) study contract manufacturing with unverifiable product
quality and hidden information on quality costs. They obtain optimal two-part linear con-
tracts depending on whether the quality is verifiable and the contract manufacturer’s quality
cost is public. Balachandran and Radhakrishnan (2005) study the quality implications of
warranties in a supply chain in which final product consists of components made by a buyer
and a supplier. Hwang et al. (2006) highlight an additional indirect cost of inspection - when
the buyer employs the inspection regime, it can induce the supplier to perform unwanted
inspection to reduce expected penalty for bad quality. They show that certification is pre-
ferred to appraisal being preferred when inspection technology becomes more effective.
Next, we discuss some of the common schemes that have been proposed for the study of
breach of contract in the context of supply chain management. Plambeck and Taylor (2004)
study situations in which parties do not always satisfy agreed upon contracts. For instance,
Plambeck and Taylor (2004) compare the effects of two common schemes, Specific Perfor-
mance and Expectation Damages (their work is in the context of renegotiations). Under
the Specific Performance scheme, the seller is required to fix the defective units. Under the
Expectation Damages scheme, the seller is required to compensate the buyer for the shortfall
in revenue due to defective units. The issue of contract enforcement has also been widely
studied by the legal fraternity (Epstrin (1989) and Schwartz (1990)). We study here another
common scheme (studied by Reyniers and Tapiero (1995)), in which the seller is required
to refund the buyer the entire purchasing cost of the defective units, which we refer to as
Full Rebate. This scheme is simple and intuitive. Sappington (2005) explains how these
penalties are particularly common in the electricity distribution industry.
We now briefly describe our results. For the case of a single buyer and single seller, we
specify conditions under which the buyer is not motivated to “squeeze” all the profits out
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of the supply chain but, rather, is able to pay a higher purchase price in order to induce
the seller to provide higher quality. The set of purchase prices that support trade split
into different regions. We identify regions where counterintuitive behavior is exhibited, for
example, the buyer prefers higher purchase price, while the seller prefers lower purchase price.
In the case of two buyers and a single seller, the nature of the interaction between the
buyers determines the quality choice of the seller. For the case of individual enforcement,
we identify how the the costs of enforcement, the purchase price and the market share of the
buyers affect the seller’s quality choice. One of the interesting results is that for some values
of purchase price, if the market shares of the two buyers is similar, the quality choice to the
buyer is low, while for dissimilar market shares the quality is high. On the other hand, in
the case of joint enforcement, we show that the seller’s quality choice is always high.
The results in this paper are presented in the case of complete information. For the case
of incomplete information regarding the buyers enforcement cost, we refer the readers to
Sheopuri and Zemel (2007) who study a class of optimization problems where the decision
maker is greedy upto an (unknown) cut-off, and regrets his decision thereafter.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We present the the model in Section
2. We first present the results for the case of a single buyer and single seller (Section 3).
The insights that we derive for this case are useful for analyzing the case of two buyers and
a single seller (Section 4). Finally, we discuss how our results generalize to N buyers and a
single seller (Section 5).
2 The Model
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Consider a supply chain consisting of N buyers and a single seller. Each buyer, i =
1, 2, ..., N wishes to buy a given (fixed) quantity Di of a product, with D =
∑N
i=1Di > 0.
The set-up is of complete information.
The product can be produced at a quality level p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Once p is set by the seller, all
buyers receive the same quality. Higher quality levels (low p) are valuable to the buyers but
costly to the seller. We assume that the production cost of the seller is C(p,D) = (u−γp)D,
with γ ≤ u. We refer to u as the cost of production and to γ as the cost of quality. Similarly,
the revenue from the units to buyer i is given by Ri(p,Di) = (v − ωp)Di, with ω ≤ v. We
refer to v as the value of a perfect unit, and to ω as the value-loss of a defective unit.
As stated earlier, we assume that the product quality is of the “experience type” in that
p can not be observed by a buyer in advance, but it becomes known to her with use. We
assume that there is a standard quality level p¯ in the market, known and agreed to by all
participants, and without loss of generality we let p¯ = 0. If a buyer observes (after the
purchase) that p > 0, she can enforce the standard by seeking remedies from the seller, but
this action is costly. We elaborate on the purchase price and on the costs of enforcement
below.
We treat the purchase price, T , as a given parameter of the problem, rather than a vari-
able to be determined by the participants of the supply chain. Thus, the analysis can be
used independently of the relative bargaining powers of the parties in terms of setting the
price. However, we determine the preference of the buyers and sellers with respect to T , and
at what levels it would be set if a given party had the power to unilaterally do so (subject
to the participation constraint of the other parties). Surprisingly, even in the simple case of
one buyer and one seller, it is not always in the buyer’s interest to set the price as low as
possible, and vice-versa for the seller.
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We assume that the cost to buyer i to enforce the standard is ci. The activities that
induce this cost may include packaging and returning defective items, paperwork and sup-
plier notification, contracting a third party to document a breach, initiating or escalating a
conflict, legal action or arbitration, or even curtailing or terminating a business relationship.
The critical factor here is that such activities are costly to the buyer. Naturally, the higher
is ci, the more reluctant is the buyer to initiate enforcement. This fact can be exploited by
the seller.
The sequence of events in the model is as follows.
1. All data of the model, v, ω, u, γ, ci, Di as well as the purchase price T are known to all
parties in advance.
2. First, the seller decides whether he wants to enter the market and offer the product
for sale at the price T , and, each buyer decides whether she wishes to participate
(individual rationality).
3. Assuming that the seller and some buyers decide to participate, the seller decides on
the quality level p, supplies each buyer the quantity Di and receives the purchase price
TDi.
4. After the purchase, all buyers discover the level of quality to be p. Based on this
information, each buyer decides whether she wishes to enforce the standard.
We assume that 0 < u ≤ v and that 0 < γ ≤ ω. Let piiB denote the profits of buyer
i and piS denote the profits of the seller. We use the argument T for pi
i
B and piS, when
we discuss the behavior of the profit function with T . Define the market efficiency due to
decentralization as the ratio of the sum of the buyers’ profits and seller’s profits to the profits
of the centralized system, i.e., ∑N
i=1 pi
i
B + piS
(v − u) ·D .
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We now analyze the single buyer case. The insights that we derive from this case are
useful for studying the case of two buyers.
We use the following convention. The interval (a, b), [a, b) is empty if a ≥ b.
3 The Single Buyer Case
When there is a single buyer, the individual enforcement and joint enforcement cases are
equivalent. For ease of notation, we use c to denote the enforcement cost of the buyer, i.e.,
c = c1, in this section. We first examine the behavior of the supply chain as a function of the
purchase price T , ignoring the effects of the individual rationality constraints. Subsequently,
we include the effects of these constraints. We first introduce some notation. Let
X = {T : T > c
D
} and Y = {T : T + γ c
DT
≥ γ}.
Proposition 3.1. Assume that both the buyer and seller participate. For the single buyer
case,
(i) if T ∈ X ∩ Y, the seller selects p∗ = c
DT
, the buyer does not enforce and the market
efficiency is
1− ω − γ
v − u ·
c
DT
,
(ii) if T /∈ X , the seller selects p∗ = 1, the buyer does not enforce and the market efficiency
is
1− ω − γ
v − u ,
(iii) if T ∈ X ∩Y ′, the seller selects p∗ = 1, the buyer does enforce and the market efficiency
is
1− ω − γ
v − u −
c
(v − u) ·D.
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Proof: We show (i). The proof of (ii) and (iii) is similar. Given p, the buyer’s objective
function is  D[v − ωp− T ] no enforcement;D[v − ωp− T (1− p)]− c enforcement.
Thus, the buyer will enforce iff
p >
c
DT
.
Anticipating this, the seller’s objective is D[T − (u− γp)] p ≤ cDT ;D[T (1− p)− (u− γp)] o/w.
The seller’s profit is maximized at p∗ = c
DT
if the profit he makes at the quality level
c
DT
without enforcement is not less than the profit he makes at the quality level 1, with
enforcement, i.e.,
γ
c
DT
≥ γ − T.
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We now briefly discuss the implication of the Proposition. In the region T /∈ X , the cost
of enforcement is “too high” compared to the purchase price. Thus, the threat of enforce-
ment is not credible and the seller provides the lowest quality knowing that he will not be
penalized. On the other hand, in the region T ∈ X ∩Y ′, the cost of producing a bad unit is
sufficiently low and the penalties invoked on enforcement are not deterring leading again to
low quality.
Next, we focus on the region T ∈ X ∩ Y . In this case, the buyer’s, seller’s and total
channel profits (piT ), respectively, are given by
piB = (v − ω · c
DT
− T ) ·D, (3.1)
piS = (T − u+ γ · c
DT
) ·D, (3.2)
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and
piT = v − u− (ω − γ) · c
DT
·D.
Thus, for a given D and T ∈ X ∩ Y , p∗ increases with the cost of enforcement, c. Conse-
quently, the channel’s profits as well as the buyer’s decrease with c. In contrast, the seller’s
profits increase with c. Also, given T and c, p∗ decreases with D: Large customers will be
less tolerant of poor quality than their small counterparts. We will examine in Section 4 how
this property affects complex markets with buyers of varying sizes.
We next discuss the incentives of the buyer and the seller as a function of the purchase
price T in the region X ∩Y . In order to do this, we first examine the structure of this region.
Lemma 3.1. ∃ t1 ≤ t2 such that
(i) X ∩ Y = ( c
D
, t1] ∪ [t2,∞),
(ii) if γ ≥ 4c
D
, the size of the interval (t1, t2) increases with γ and is given by
|t1 − t2| =
√
γ · (γ − 4c/D),
(iii) if γ < 4c
D
, t1 = t2 and X ∩ Y = ( cD ,∞).
Proof: Omitted. 2
Combining Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 3.1, we study p∗ as a function of the purchase
price, T (the cases γ < 4c
D
and γ ≥ 4c
D
are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 (see Appendix B)
respectively. For the case of γ ≥ 4c
D
, the behavior of p∗ in the interval (t1, t2) is the result of
the fact that c/D is “too small”, i.e., the buyer is “too demanding”. In such cases, given the
stringent demand of the buyer, the seller finds it advantageous to produce the lowest level of
quality p∗ = 1 despite enforcement. Thus, the seller’s quality choice need not be monotone
in the purchase price. Likewise, the quality choice of the seller need not be monotone in
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the cost of enforcement. Figures 3 and 4 (see Appendix B) show the market efficiency as a
function of T for the two cases.
We now examine the effect of the individual rationality constraints. For T ∈ X ∩ Y , the
buyer participates iff his profits are non-negative, i.e., v − T − ω c
DT
≥ 0, while the seller
participates iff T − u+ γ c
DT
≥ 0.
To illustrate the managerial insights that our model demonstrates, it suffices to restrict
ourselves to the case γ < 4c
D
, i.e., X ∩ Y = ( c
D
,∞). Under this assumption, we consider the
profit functions of the buyer and the seller.
Consider the seller first. Recall that the seller’s profit when T ∈ X ∩ Y is
piS(T ) = T − u+ γ c
DT
.
In general, the region ( c
D
,∞) may be partitioned into three intervals M1,M2 and M3, such
that (i) if T ∈ M3, the seller participates and his profits are increasing with the purchase
price, T , (ii) if T ∈ M2, the seller will not participate, and (iii) if T ∈ M1, the seller will
participate but his profits are decreasing with the purchase price, T .
Depending on the problem parameters, M1 and / or M2 may be empty. For example, in
Figure 5 (see Appendix), M1 = (24, 27.71], M2 = {} and M3 = (27.71,∞). However, if
min{u · u
4c/D
,
4c
D
} > γ > max{c/D, u− c/D},
all three regions are non-empty.
Next, we consider the buyer. Recall that the buyer’s profit when T ∈ X ∩ Y is
piB(T ) = v − T − ω c
DT
.
In general, the region ( c
D
,∞) may be partitioned into four intervals, N1, N2, N3 and N4, such
that (i) if T ∈ N2, the buyer participates and his profits are decreasing with the purchase
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price, T , (ii) if T ∈ N1 ∪ N4, the buyer will not participate, and (iii) if T ∈ N3, the buyer
will participate but his profits are increasing with the purchase price, T .
Depending on the problem parameters, any of the intervals N1, N2 and N3 may be empty.
For example, in Figure 5, N1 = {}, N2 = (24, 30.98], N3 = (30.98, 77.63], N4 = (77.63,∞).
Also, if v is too low (v < 2
√
ωc
D
), then the buyer will not participate at any price (N2 =
N3 = {}). However, if
v · v
4c/D
> ω > max{c/D, v − c/D} and γ < 4c
D
,
all the regions N1, N2, N3 and N4 are non-empty.
We now study the incentives of the buyer and seller simultaneously. We first show that
any interval [a, b] in which both the buyer and the seller participate cannot be such that the
buyer’s and seller’s profits are decreasing with the purchase price in this interval.
Lemma 3.2. Let T ∈ X ∩ Y. Let [a, b] be such that the buyer’s profits are decreasing with
T in [a, b]. Then, the seller’s profits are increasing with T in [a, b].
Proof: The proof follows from noting that√
γc
D
= argmin piS(T ) ≤ argmin piB(T ) =
√
ωc
D
.
2
Of course, if both the buyer and seller participate, the other three cases may exist, i.e.,
(i) the buyer’s profits are increasing with T , while the seller’s profits are decreasing with T ,
(ii) the buyer’s profits are decreasing with T , while the seller’s profits are increasing with
T , and, (iii) both the buyer’s and sellers profits are increasing with T (see Figure 5). The
region (i) (T ∈ M1 ∩ N3) is particularly interesting and counter to intuition. The region
corresponds to the case where the purchase price, T is low and p∗ is high (poor quality). An
example might be a street vendor selling inexpensive watches. The region (ii) (T ∈M3∩N2)
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corresponds to the case where the incentives of the buyer and the seller are “normal”, i.e., in
this region, the buyer prefers lower purchase while the seller prefers higher purchase price. In
this region, the purchase price, T is high and p∗ is low (high quality). These observations are
summarized in the table below that describes the seller’s quality choice for the regimes where
the buyer’s and / or seller’s profits are increasing / decreasing with the purchase price. The
region where both piS(T ) and piB(T ) are decreasing does not exist, and the corresponding
entry in the table is left vacant.
Table: Quality level decision by the seller.
piS(T ) Increasing piS(T ) Decreasing
piB(T ) Increasing Medium Low
piB(T ) Decreasing High
We now compare the quality level, p∗ in the Full Rebate contracts above with the Specific
Performance and Expectation Damages contracts studied by Plambeck and Taylor (2004).
Under the first contract, if the buyer enforces the contract, the seller fixes the defective units
at a per-unit cost of δ. Consequently, in this case, p∗ = c
Dδ
. Under the second contract, the
seller compensates the buyer the revenue-loss due to defective units resulting in a quality
level p∗ = c
Dω
. Note that, in both these schemes, the quality level is independent of the
purchase price. Also, in both cases, the buyer’s profits decrease with purchase price and the
seller’s profits increase with purchase price (the “normal” region).
4 The Two Buyer Case
In this section, we study the case of two buyers and a single seller. We consider the individual
and joint enforcement regimes. We assume, without loss of generality, that the per-unit cost
of enforcement of buyer 1 is no greater than that of buyer 2, i.e.,
c1/D1 ≤ c2/D2.
11
We refer to buyer 1 as the “demanding buyer” and to buyer 2 as the “lax buyer”.
4.1 Individual Enforcement
In the individual enforcement regime, if buyer i enforces and finds the seller’s units to be
defective, the standard is enforced on the units supplied only to him. Since each buyers
decision is independent of the others, buyer i enforces if p > ci
DiT
.
For i = 1, 2, define Si to be the set of purchase prices where the seller’s profits, when
only buyer i is present, are non-negative. Define S12 to be the set of purchase prices where
the seller’s profits when both buyers, 1 and 2 are present are non-negative under individual
enforcement. Similarly, define Bi to be the set of purchase prices where the buyer’s profits,
piiB, when only buyer i is present are non-negative. Define B12 to be the set of purchase prices
where the profits of both buyer 1 and buyer 2 are non-negative under individual enforcement.
Lemma 4.1.
S1 ⊆ S12 ⊆ S2 and B2 ⊆ B12 ⊆ B1.
Proof: We discuss the proof of S1 ⊆ S12. The proof of S12 ⊆ S2 and of B2 ⊆ B12 ⊆ B1
is similar. Let T ∈ S1. Then, when only buyer 1 is present, the seller’s optimal quality level,
p∗1, is such that pi
1
S ≥ 0. Further, since c1D1 ≤ c2D2 , the seller’s profits when only buyer 2 is
present, at the quality level p∗1 is no less than
D1
D
· pi1S ≥ 0. Therefore, the seller’s optimal
profit when both buyers are present, at the quality level p∗1 is no less than pi
1
S ·(1+ D2D1 ) ≥ 0. 2
We now develop the analysis similar to the single buyer case. We first study the quality
level and the market efficiency ignoring the individual rationality constraints. We then study
the effect of these constraints.
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Let
X1 = {T : T > c1
D1
} and X2 = {T : T > c2
D2
}.
Let
Y1 = {T : T + γ c1
D1T
≥ γ} and Y2 = {T : T + γ · c2
D2T
≥ γ + c2
D2
· D1
D
}.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that both the buyers and the seller participate. For the two buyer
case under individual enforcement,
(i) if T ∈ X2 ∩ (Y1 ∪ Y2), the seller selects the quality level,
p∗12 =
 c1D1T D1D ≥
γ
T
( c2/D2−c1/D1
c2/D2
);
c2
D2T
o/w.
Buyer 1 enforces only when p∗12 =
c2
D2T
; buyer 2 never enforces and the market efficiency is
η12 =
 1−
ω−γ
v−u · c1D1T D1D ≥
γ
T
( c2/D2−c1/D1
c2/D2
);
1− ω−γ
v−u · c2D2T − c1(v−u)·D o/w.
(ii) if T ∈ X2 ∩ (Y1 ∪Y2)′, the seller selects the quality level p∗12 = 1 and both buyers enforce;
the market efficiency is given by
1− ω − γ
v − u −
c1 + c2
(v − u) ·D,
(iii) if T /∈ X1, the seller selects the quality level p∗12 = 1 and neither buyer enforces; the
market efficiency is given by
1− ω − γ
v − u ,
(iv) if T ∈ X1 ∩ X ′2, the seller selects the quality level
p∗12 =
 c1D1T γ · (1− c1D1T ) ≥ T · D1D ;1 o/w.
Buyer 1 enforces only when p∗12 = 1; buyer 2 never enforces and the market efficiency is
η12 =
 1−
ω−γ
v−u · c1D1T γ · (1− c1D1T ) ≥ T · D1D ;
1− ω−γ
v−u − c1(v−u)·D o/w.
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Proof: We show (i). The proof of (ii), (iii) and (iv) is similar. The seller’s profit as a
function of his defect rate, p is piece-wise linear:
(T − u+ γp)D p ≤ c1
D1T
;
((T − u) + p(γ − T D1
D
))D c1
D1T
< p ≤ c2
D2T
;
(T − u− (T − γ)p)D p > c2
D2T
.
When p < c1
D2T
(region 1), neither buyer enforces; when c1
D2T
< p ≤ c2
D2T
(region 2), buyer 1
enforces but buyer 2 does not; while when p > c2
D2T
(region 3), both buyers enforce. Since
T ∈ Y1 ∪ Y2, the seller’s profits at the quality levels c1D1T or c2D2T are higher than those at
the quality level 1. Since the seller’s profit function is piece-wise linear, an optimal solution
for the seller is to choose either p = c1
D1T
or p = c2
D2T
. An optimal solution is p = c1
D1T
if
[T − u+ γ c1
D1T
]D ≥ [(T − u) + (γ − T D1
D
) c2
D2T
]D or
D1
D
≥ γ
T
(
c2/D2 − c1/D1
c2/D2
). (4.3)
2
We next discuss the managerial implications of the Proposition. For simplicity, we restrict
our discussion to the set of purchase prices T ∈ X2∩(Y1∪Y2). We define m to be the market
share of the demanding buyer, i.e.,
m =
D1
D
.
We are interested in understanding how the market share and the costs of enforcement (c1
and c2) affect the quality level decision.
We first study how the market share, m affects the quality level decision for a given c1/c2.
From our assumption that c1/D1 ≤ c2/D2, it follows that
m ≥ c1
c1 + c2
. (4.4)
Rewriting inequality 4.3 in terms of m, we note that if
m+
1
m
· γ
T
· c1
c2
≥ γ
T
· (c1
c2
+ 1),
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then the seller chooses p = c1
D1T
. For high enough values of m, the impact of the lax buyer
is negligible. For low values of m (m ≈ c1
c1+c2
), the two buyers have similar per-unit en-
forcement costs, i.e., c1/D1 ≈ c2/D2. In that case, the gain from the reducing the quality
from c1
D1T
to c2
D2T
is too small to compensate the seller for the impact of enforcement by the
demanding buyer. In both cases, the result is that the seller behaves as if the entire market
was demanding. The lax buyer “free rides” on the demanding buyer, and his profits are
higher than would prevail if the demanding buyer did not exist. However, for intermediate
values of m, the buyer may find it advantageous to “split” the market by supplying the
quality level c2
D2T
. In that case, the demanding buyer will enforce, while the lax buyer will
not. The demanding buyer “suffers” from the existence of lax buyer since he is supplied with
lower quality than would have been the case if the lax buyer did not exist.
Next, we study the effect of the relative costs of enforcement of the demanding and lax
buyer on the quality level decision, for a given value of the market share, m. Again, note
that our assumption c1/D1 ≤ c2/D2 implies that
c1
c2
≥ 1−m
m
.
Under this assumption, the seller selects c1
D1T
if
c1/c2 ≥ (1− mT
γ
) · m
1−m
and c2
D2T
otherwise. If the cost of enforcement of the demanding buyer is low, she will enforce
the contract anyway and the seller selects the quality level c2
D2T
.
These observations that can be summarized in the table below which illustrates the the
quality choice by the seller in different regimes of the problem parameters. When the market
share of the demanding buyer is low (but greater than c1
c1+c2
) or high, the seller’s quality choice
is high. However, when the market share of the demanding buyer is an intermediate value,
the seller may select an inferior quality level. The quality level is also inferior if the cost of
enforcement of the demanding buyer is similar to that of the lax buyer. Finally, note that
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the seller is induced to provide a higher quality level only when the purchase price, T is
greater than a certain threshold.
Table: Quality level decision by the seller with market share of demanding buyer.
Low Medium High
Market share of Demanding Buyer High Low High
Table: Quality level decision by the seller with cost of enforcement of demanding to lax
Buyer.
Low High
Cost of Enforcement of Demanding to Lax Buyer Low High
Table: Quality level decision by the seller with purchase price.
Low High
Purchase Price Low High
We now examine the effect of the individual rationality constraints for the region (Y1 ∪
Y2) ∩ X2. The analysis for the other regions is similar and is hence omitted.
Lemma 4.2. Let T ∈ (Y1 ∪ Y2) ∩ X2.
(i) If D1
D
≥ γ
T
( c2/D2−c1/D1
c2/D2
), buyer i, i = 1, 2 participates iff
v − ω c1
D1T
− T ≥ 0,
and the seller participates iff
T − u+ γ c1
D1T
≥ 0.
(ii) If D1
D
< γ
T
( c2/D2−c1/D1
c2/D2
), buyer 1 participates iff
v − ω c2
D2T
− T + c2
D2
− c1
D1
≥ 0,
buyer 2 participates iff
v − ω c2
D2T
− T ≥ 0,
and the seller participates iff
T − u+ γ c2
D2T
− c2
D2
· D1
D
≥ 0.
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4.2 Joint Enforcement
In the joint enforcement regime, if buyer i enforces the quality standard, and finds the units
supplied to her to be defective, the seller compensates all the buyers for the defective units.
We first derive results similar to Lemma 4.1 for the joint enforcement case.
Define S ′12 to be the set of purchase prices where the seller’s profits when both buyers,
1 and 2 are present are non-negative under joint enforcement. Define B′12 to be the set of
purchase prices where the profits of both buyer 1 and buyer 2 are non-negative under joint
enforcement. We can show the following result.
Lemma 4.3.
S ′12 ⊆ S1 ⊆ S2 and B2 ⊆ B1 ⊆ B′12.
We now study the incentives of the players under the joint enforcement regime with two
buyers. We will show that the the seller’s profit function is given by
((T − u) + γp)D p ≤ c1
D1T
;
((T − u+ c1
D1
)− (T − γ)p)D c1
D1T
< p ≤ c2
D2T
;
((T − u)− (T − γ)p+ c1c2
D1D2Tp
)D p > c2
D2T
,
Thus, when p ≤ c1
D1T
(region 1), there is no enforcement; when c1
D1T
< p ≤ c2
D2T
(region 2), the
enforcement is caused by the “demanding buyer”; while in the case when p > c2
D2T
(region
3), both buyers have an incentive to enforce (However, each prefers that the other enforces).
The seller may be tempted to select p in region 3 in order to provoke an “enforcement war”
between the buyers hoping that none would enforce. Such a war can indeed be set up by
the seller for certain values of the purchase price, T . Note that the “enforcement war” is
equivalent to the classical game of chicken.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that both the buyer and seller participate. Let T ∈ X2. For the
case of two buyers under joint enforcement,
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(i) if T ≥ γ, the seller selects the quality level p′∗12 = c1D1T , and no buyer enforces; the market
efficiency is given by
η′12 = 1−
ω − γ
v − u ·
c1
D1T
(ii) if T < γ, the seller selects the quality level,
p∗12 =
 c2D2T γ − T + c2D2 − c1D1 ≤ c2D2T · (γ − c1D1 );1 o/w,
buyer 1 enforces with probability 1− c2
D2p∗12T
and buyer 2 with probability 1− c2
D2p∗12T
; the market
efficiency is given by
η′12 = 1−
ω − γ
v − u · p
∗
12 +
c1c2
D1D2Tp∗12
− c1
D1
− c2
D2
.
Proof: The proof of (i) is a special case for N > 1 buyers which is provided in the
Appendix as a special case of N buyers. The proof of (ii) is similar. 2
Thus, when the purchase price is high enough (T ≥ γ), the threat of enforcement is
credible and the seller’s quality choice is conservative. However, for low values of the purchase
price (T < γ), the seller is tempted to provide lower quality as the punishment from being
enforced is not high enough.
Lemma 4.4. Let T > c2/D2 and T ≥ γ. For the case of two buyers under joint enforcement,
buyer i, i = 1, 2 participates iff
v − ω c1
D1T
− T ≥ 0,
and the seller participates iff
T − u+ γ c1
D1T
≥ 0.
5 Joint Enforcement with N Buyers
In this section, we discuss extensions on the results of two buyers to N buyers. We outline
how the results in Section 4 extend to N buyers in the joint enforcement regime. We do not
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discuss the extension for individual enforcement, as it offers no additional insight into the
problem.
Without loss of generality, we assume that c1
D1
≤ c2
D2
≤ ... ≤ cN
DN
. We will find the
following notation useful. Let Aj be the sum of the demands of buyers 1, 2, ..., j, i.e.,
Aj =
∑j
i=1Di, j = 1, 2, .., N . We will assume throughout that T >
cN
DN
as this is the
interesting case in which all the quantities, c1
D1T
, c2
D2T
, ..., cN
DNT
are strictly less than one.
Recall that in the individual enforcement regime, each buyers’ decision is independent of
the others, and hence, buyer i enforces if p > ci
DiT
. The seller’s profit is given by
piS =
∑
i:p≤ ci
DiT
Di[T − (u− γp)] +
∑
i:p>
ci
DiT
Di[T (1− p)− (u− γp)]
= D[T − (u− γp)]−
∑
i:p>
ci
DiT
DiTp.
Consequently, the seller’s quality choice, p∗ ∈ { c1
D1T
, c2
D2T
, ..., cN
DNT
, 1}. By enumerating the
profits at each element of this set and setting cN+1/DN+1 = T , we identify that the seller
selects the quality level ck
DkT
, 1 ≤ k ≤ N + 1 if
T ≥ γD
(
cj
Dj
− ck
Dk
)
cj
Dj
Aj−1 − ckDkAk−1
,∀j > k
and
T ≤ γD
(
cj
Dj
− ck
Dk
)
cj
Dj
Aj−1 − ckDkAk−1
,∀j < k.
In that case, buyers {1, 2, ..., k − 1} enforce, while buyers {k, k + 1, ..., N} don’t.
Now consider the joint enforcement regime. Clearly, in this case as well, the seller’s qual-
ity choice, p∗ ∈ { c1
D1T
, c2
D2T
, ..., cN
DNT
, 1}. However, we show that when T ≥ γ, the seller selects
the quality level c1
D1T
and no buyer enforces.
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Proposition 5.1. Let T > cN/DN and T ≥ γ. Assume that all the N buyers and the seller
participate. Then, for the case of joint enforcement, the seller selects the quality level c1
D1T
and no buyer enforces.
Proof: Clearly, when p ≤ c1
D1T
, the sellers profit function is increasing with p. Further,
in the region c1
D1T
< p ≤ c2
D2T
, player 1 enforces (he knows no other player would enforce) and
the sellers profit function is decreasing. Now consider the case p > c2
D2T
. Is an Audit War
possible? In this case, ∃ r ≥ 2 such that cr
DrT
≤ p ≤ cr+1
Dr+1T
. Clearly, buyers r+1, r+2, ..., N
will never enforce. We now restrict ourselves to the set of buyers 1, 2, ..., r. Let xi be the
probability that buyer i does not enforce. Then the probability that none of the others
enforce is given by:
zi =
Πri=1xi
xi
.
The pay-offs for buyer i when none of the other buyers enforce and when at least one
other buyer enforces is given in the table below.
Table: Pay-offs for buyer i
Buyer i does not enforce Buyer i enforces
Buyers j, j 6= i don’t enforce [(v − wp)− T ]Di [(v − wp)− T (1− p)− ciDi ]Di
At least one buyer j, j 6= i enforces [(v − wp)− T (1− p)]Di [(v − wp)− T (1− p)− ciDi ]Di
In equilibrium, buyer i is indifferent between enforcing and not enforcing, i.e, zi =
ci
DipT
.
Now
x1 = r−1
√
z2z3...zr
zr−21
= r−1
√
c2/D2 · c3/D3...cr/Dr
(c1/D1)
r−2 (pT )
− 1
r−1 ,
and hence
x1z1Tp =
r−1
√
c2/D2 · c3/D3...cr/Dr
(c1/D1)
r−2 (pT )
− 1
r−1
c1
D1pT
pT = r−1
√
c1/D1 · c2/D2 · c3/D3...cr/Dr(pT )−
1
r−1 .
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Therefore, the seller’s profit function is given by:
[(T − (u− γp))xiz1 + (T (1− p)− (u− γp)](1− xizi)]D = (T − u− (T − γ)p)D + TpxiziD
= (T − u− (T − γ)p)D
+ r−1
√
c1/D1 · c2/D2 · c3/D3...cr/Dr(pT )−
1
r−1D,
which is decreasing in p (since r > 2). 2
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